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Abstract. We consider the Stackelberg shortest-path pricing problem,
which is defined as follows. Given a graph G with fixed-cost and pricable
edges and two distinct vertices s and t, we may assign prices to the prica-
ble edges. Based on the predefined fixed costs and our prices, a customer
purchases a cheapest s-t-path in G and we receive payment equal to the
sum of prices of pricable edges belonging to the path. Our goal is to
find prices maximizing the payment received from the customer. While
Stackelberg shortest-path pricing was known to be APX-hard before, we
provide the first explicit approximation threshold and prove hardness of
approximation within 2− o(1). We also argue that the nicely structured
type of instance resulting from our reduction captures most of the chal-
lenges we face in dealing with the problem in general and, in particular,
we show that the gap between the revenue of an optimal pricing and the
only known general upper bound can still be logarithmically large.
1 Introduction
The notion of algorithmic pricing encompasses a wide range of optimization
problems aiming to assign revenue-maximizing prices to some ﬁxed set of items
given information about the valuation functions of potential customers [1,13]. In
a line of recent work the approximation complexity of this kind of problem has
received considerable attention.
Without supply constraints, the very simple single-price algorithm, which re-
duces the search to the one-dimensional subspace of pricings assigning identical
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prices to all the items, achieves an approximation guarantee of O(logn+logm),
where n and m denote the number of item types and customers, respectively
[4,7]. Corresponding hardness of approximation results of Ω(logε m) for some
ε > 0 are known to hold (under diﬀerent complexity theoretic assumptions) even
in the special cases that valuation functions are single-minded (items are strict
complements) [12] or unit-demand (items are strict substitutes) [5,8,11]. In these
cases, it is the potentially conﬂicting nature of diﬀerent customers’ valuations
that constitutes the combinatorial diﬃculty of multi-dimensional pricing.
Another line of researchhas been considering so-calledStackelberg pricing prob-
lems [17], in which valuation functions are expressed implicitly in terms of some
optimization problem. More formally, we are given a set of items, each of which
has some ﬁxed cost associated with it. In addition to these ﬁxed costs, we may
assign prices to a subset of the items. Given both ﬁxed costs and prices, a single
customer will purchase a min-cost subset of items subject to some feasibility con-
straints and we receive payment equal to the prices assigned to items purchased
by the customer. As an example, we may think of items as being the edges of a
graph and a customer aiming to buy a min-cost spanning tree, cheapest path, etc.
Clearly, as there is only a single customer in this type of problem, conﬂicting
valuation functions can no longer pose a barrier for the design of eﬃcient pricing
algorithms and, indeed, there are several examples of algorithmic results breaking
the logarithmic approximation barrier of the general case in situations where
the optimization problem solved by the customer is of a certain type [7], the
underlying graph is particularly well-structured [10] or the customer is restricted
to applying a speciﬁc approximation algorithm solving her cost-minimization
problem sub-optimally [6].
Yet, many central Stackelberg pricing problems - and in particular the afore-
mentioned spanning tree and shortest path versions in their unrestricted form -
have so far resisted all attempts at improving over the single-price algorithm’s
logarithmic approximation guarantee. At the same time, the best known hard-
ness results to date only prove APX-hardness of both the spanning tree [9] and
shortest path [14] cases without even deriving explicit constants.
1.1 Preliminaries
In the Stackelberg shortest-path pricing problem (StackSP), we are given a di-
rected graph G = (V,A), a cost function c : A → R+0 , a distinguished set of
pricable edges P ⊂ A, |P| = m, and two distinguished nodes s, t ∈ V . We may
assign prices p : P → R+0 to the pricable edges. Given these prices, a customer
will purchase a shortest directed s-t-path P ∗ in G, i.e.,
P ∗ ∈ argmin
{∑
e∈P
(c(e) + p(e))
∣∣∣P is s-t-path
}
,
and we receive revenue rev(p) =
∑
e∈P∗ p(e). We assume w.l.o.g.
1 that in case
of a tie, the customer selects from the above set a path maximizing our revenue.
1 We can make this assumption since decreasing all prices by a factor arbitrarily close
to 1 will break ties in favor of higher revenue paths.
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We want to ﬁnd a price assignment p maximizing rev(p). Throughout the rest of
this paper, we will w.l.o.g. only consider StackSP instances for which c(e) = 0
for all e ∈ P , i.e., every edge is either pricable or ﬁxed-cost, but never both.
1.2 Contributions
In this paper, we present the ﬁrst explicit hardness of approximation result for
the shortest path version of Stackelberg pricing, which we show to be hard to
approximate within a factor of 2 − o(1). The result is based on a reduction
that is somewhat similar to the ones previously described in [16] and [14] to
derive NP-hardness and APX-hardness, respectively. Our contribution consists
of identifying the right starting point for the reduction in order to utilize the full
potential of the construction and applying a completely new analysis which yields
the desired gap. This novel analysis parts completely from previous approaches,
as it argues explicitly about the structure of solutions to the resulting path
pricing instances. These results are found in Section 2. Despite their apparent
simplicity, these instances, which we refer to as a shortcut instances, seem to
capture most of the challenges we face in dealing with the problem in general. It
is then a natural question to ask whether we can obtain improved approximation
results by exploiting the special structure of these instances or the insights gained
from our analysis of the structural properties of their solutions. Unfortunately,
it turns out that this might not be an easy task, since we can prove that the gap
between the optimal revenue and the upper bound used in all known algorithmic
results can still be of essentially logarithmic size. These results are presented in
Section 3.
2 Hardness of Approximation
Theorem 1. StackSP cannot be approximated in polynomial time within a
factor of 2− 2−Ω(log1−ε m) for any ε > 0, unless NP ⊆ DTIME(nO(logn)).
2.1 Proof of Theorem 1
The proof of the Theorem is based on a reduction from the label cover prob-
lem (LabelCover), which is deﬁned as follows. Given a bipartite graph G =
(V,W,E), a set L = {1, . . . , k} of labels and a set R(v,w) ⊆ L × L of satisfying
label combinations for every edge (v, w) ∈ E, we want to ﬁnd a label assignment
 : V ∪ W → L to the vertices of G satisfying the maximum possible number
of edges, i.e., edges (v, w) with ((v), (w)) ∈ R(v,w). The following hardness
result for LabelCover, which is an easy consequence of the PCP theorem [3]
combined with Raz’ parallel repetition theorem [15], is found, e.g., in the survey
by Arora and Lund [2].
Theorem 2. For LabelCover on graphs with n vertices, m edges and label
set of size k = O(n) there exists no polynomial time algorithm to decide whether
the maximum number of satisfiable edges is m or at most m/2log
1−ε m for any
ε > 0, unless NP ⊆ DTIME(nO(logn)).
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Reduction. Let an instance G = (V,W,E) with label set L = {1, . . . , k} as in
Theorem 2 be given. Denote E = {(v1, w1) . . . , (vm, wm)}, where the ordering
of the edges is chosen arbitrarily. Note that in our notation, vi, vj with i = j
may well refer to the same vertex (and the same is true for wi, wj). For ease of
notation we denote by Ri the satisfying label combinations for edge (vi, wi).
We create a StackSP instance as follows. For every edge (vi, wi) we con-
struct a gadget as depicted in Fig. 1. Essentially, the gadget consist of a set of
parallel pricable edges, one for each satisfying label assignment (κ, λ) ∈ Ri and
an additional parallel ﬁxed-cost edge of price 2.
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Fig. 1. Gadget for an edge (vi, wi) in the label cover instance. Each pricable edge
corresponds to one satisfying label assignment (κ, λ) to vertices vi, wi.
These gadgets are joined together sequentially (see Fig. 2). Let i < j and
consider two pricable edges corresponding to label assignments (κ, λ) ∈ Ri and
(μ, ν) ∈ Rj . We connect the endpoint of the ﬁrst edge with the start point of the
second edge with a shortcut edge of cost j − i− 1, if the two label assignments
are conﬂicting, i.e., if either vi = vj and κ = μ or wi = wj and λ = ν. This
construction is depicted in Fig. 2. Finally, we deﬁne the ﬁrst node in the gadget
corresponding to edge (v1, w1) and the last node in the gadget corresponding to
(vm, wm) as nodes s and t the customer seeks to connect via a directed shortest
path. We will refer to the gadgets by their indices 1, . . . ,m and denote the
pricable edge corresponding to label assignment (κ, λ) in gadget i as ei,κ,λ.
Completeness. Let  be a label assignment satisfying all edges in G. We deﬁne
a corresponding pricing p by setting for every pricable edge p(ei,κ,λ) = 2 if
(vi) = κ, (wi) = λ and p(ei,κ,λ) = +∞ else.
The resulting shortest path from s to t cannot use any of the shortcut edges,
because, as  is a feasible label assignment, out of any two pricable edges corre-
sponding to conﬂicting assignments, one must be priced at +∞. Consequently,
no path using a shortcut edge can have ﬁnite cost. On the other hand, since 
satisﬁes every edge, there is a pricable edge of cost 2 in each of the gadgets. It is
then w.l.o.g. to assume that the customer purchases the shortest path using the
maximum possible number of pricable edges and, hence, total revenue is 2m.
Soundness. Let p be a given pricing resulting in overall revenue m + c and let
P denote the shortest path purchased by the customer given these prices. We
will argue that there exists a label assignment  satisfying c/4 of the edges in G.
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First note that w.l.o.g. any pricable edge that is not part of path P has price
+∞ under price assignment p. In particular, this means that in every gadget
i there is at most a single pricable edge with a ﬁnite price. We call this edge
the P -edge of gadget i. We proceed by grouping gadgets into so-called islands as
detailed below.
Islands. Let σ1 be the ﬁrst gadget with a P -edge and call σ1 the start point of
an island. Now for each σi ﬁnd the maximum value of j > σi, such that gadget j
has a P -edge and there exists a shortcut edge between the P -edges of gadgets σi
and j. If such a j exists, deﬁne σi+1 = j, else call σi an end point of an island, let
k > σi be the minimum value such that gadget k has a P -edge, deﬁne σi+1 = k
and call σi+1 a start point. If no such k exists, call σi an end point and stop.
Let σr be the end point of the ﬁnal island.
We call σ1, . . . , σr the significant gadgets. Note that by construction every
gadget with a P -edge is covered by some island, i.e., the interval deﬁned by
some consecutive start and end points.
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(μ,ν) Rj
(κ,λ) Ri
s t
j−i−1
Fig. 2. Assembling the edge gadgets into a StackSP instance. Conflicting label as-
signments on two edges (vi, wi), (vj , wj) are connected by a shortcut of length j− i−1.
All edges are directed from left to right.
Fact 1. Consider an island σα, . . . , σω. Path P does not enter gadget σα or exit
gadget σω via a shortcut edge.
Proof. If P exits σω via a shortcut edge, then σω could not have been declared
an end point. If σα is entered via a shortcut edge, this shortcut must originate
from a gadget i < σα which lies within the preceding island. As P cannot bypass
the endpoint of the preceding island via a shortcut, i must in fact be the end
point σα−1 and so σα could not have become a start point. 
Consider now a single island σα, . . . , σω. By i we denote the length of the
shortcut edge between gadgets σi and σi+1 for α ≤ i ≤ ω − 1. Furthermore, by
ini and outi we refer to the lengths of the shortcut edges used by path P to
enter and exit gadget σi, respectively, and set them to 0 if no shortcuts are used.
From Fact 1 above it follows that inα = outω = inα+1 = 0. See Fig. 3 for an
illustration.
For α ≤ i ≤ ω let the cost of path P between shortcut edges outi and ini+1
be ri + ci, where ri denotes the cost due to pricable edges and ci the cost due
to ﬁxed-cost edges, respectively. We are going to bound the expression pσi + ri,
which is the sum of prices paid for the section of path P running from gadget
σi to σi+1 − 1.
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We note that ω = 0, since by the fact that gadget σω is an endpoint, no
shortcut edge connects its P -edge to the P -edge of another gadget. Similarly,
we have rω = 0, since path P does not use pricable edges between islands, as we
have argued before.
Path P crosses the end node of the P -edge in gadget σi (node v2 in Fig. 3) and
the start node of the P -edge of gadget σi+1 (node v4 in Fig. 3) for α ≤ i ≤ ω−1.
The total cost of path P between these two vertices is outi + ri + ci + ini+1.
An alternative path P1 is obtained by replacing this part of P with the shortcut
edge of length i between σi and σi+1. By the fact that P is the shortest path
we have outi + ri + ci + ini+1 ≤ i and, thus,
ri ≤ i − outi − ini+1 for α ≤ i ≤ ω, (1)
where the bound on rω follows from the fact that for i = ω all summands in the
above expression are 0. Similarly, the cost of path P between the start node of
the shortcut edge into gadget σi (node v1 in Fig. 3) and the end node of the
shortcut edge exiting σi (node v3 in Fig. 3) is ini + pσi + outi for α ≤ i ≤ ω. We
obtain an alternative path P2 by taking only ﬁxed cost edges of cost 2 to bypass
both shortcuts and gadget σi at total cost 2(ini + outi + 1). Again, since P is
the shortest path, we get ini + pσi + outi ≤ 2(ini + outi + 1), or
pσi ≤ 2 + ini + outi for α ≤ i ≤ ω . (2)
Combining (1) and (2) yields
pσi + ri ≤ 2 + i + ini − ini+1 for α ≤ i ≤ ω . (3)
Finally, we have
ω∑
i=α
(
pσi + ri
)
≤
ω∑
i=α
(
2 + i + ini − ini+1
)
(4)
= 2(ω − α + 1) +
ω∑
i=α
i + inα − inω+1 (5)
= 2(ω − α + 1) +
ω∑
i=α
i, (6)
where (6) holds since start points σα and σω+1 are not entered via shortcuts and,
thus, inα = inω+1 = 0. Recall that σ1, . . . , σr denote the signiﬁcant gadgets
across all islands. Assume now that there is a total number I of islands with
start and end points σα(1), σω(1), . . . , σα(I), σω(I). Summing over all islands we
get that overall revenue of price assignment p is bounded by
I∑
j=1
ω(j)∑
i=α(j)
pσi + ri ≤
I∑
j=1
(
2
(
ω(j)− α(j) + 1) +
ω(j)∑
i=α(j)
i
)
≤ 2r + m,
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where the last inequality follows from the fact that α(j) = ω(j − 1) + 1 for
2 ≤ j ≤ I, ω(I) = r and ∑ri=1 i ≤ m, since all shortcuts deﬁning the i are
disjoint. Thus, we have m + c ≤ 2r + m, or r ≥ c/2.
So we have established a relation between the revenue of a price assignment
and the number of its signiﬁcant gadgets. It remains to show that a pricing’s
signiﬁcant gadgets can be used to construct a label assignment satisfying a large
number of the corresponding edges. Towards this end, consider the P -edges
of the r/2 gadgets σ1, σ3, σ5, . . . and their corresponding label assignments
(κi, λi). By deﬁnition, there are no shortcut edges between the P -edges of any
of these gadgets and, thus, (κ1, λ1), (κ3, λ3), . . . deﬁne a non-conﬂicting label
assignment satisfying at least r/2 ≥ c/4 edges in G. More precisely, labels
(κ1, λ1), (κ3, λ3), . . . can be extended into a complete label assignment satisfying
c/4 edges by choosing all unspeciﬁed labels in an arbitrary fashion.
Finally, consider a label cover instance as in Theorem 2 and the path pric-
ing instance resulting from our reduction above. If all edges can be satisﬁed,
maximum path pricing revenue is 2m. If no label assignment satisﬁes more
than m/2log
1−ε m edges, maximum path pricing revenue is bounded by (1 +
4/2log
1−ε m)m. This completes the proof of Theorem 1. 
v4v3v2v1
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
li−1
iin iout
l i
ini+1
σi
.
.
.
.
.
.
P1
2P
σi+1
P
Fig. 3. Two consecutive significant gadgets σi, σi+1 inside one island. The length of
the shortcut edges used to enter and exit gadget σi (defined as 0 if no such shortcut
exists) are denoted as ini and outi, respectively.
Tightness. We brieﬂy mention that our analysis is tight in the following sense.
It is easy to check that by assigning price 1 to all pricable edges we can make
sure that w.l.o.g. the shortest s-t-path uses a pricable edge in each of the gadgets
and, thus, we obtain revenue m. Since maximum possible revenue is bounded
above by 2m (there is an s-t-path of that cost that does not use any pricable
edges), it follows that it is trivial to achieve approximation guarantee 2 on the
instances resulting from our reduction.
3 Shortcut Instances
In this section we take a closer look at the type of instances resulting from our
reduction, which we believe present an important milestone in getting a further
improvement in terms of hardness or algorithmic results. We will be interested
in the family of so-called shortcut instances, which we deﬁne as follows.
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We say that a gadget H consists of source and sink nodes connected by (i) a
ﬁxed cost edge from source to sink and (ii) node-disjoint paths of length three
where each path is directed from the source to the sink, alternating between
ﬁxed-cost, pricable, and ﬁxed-cost edges. For example, the graph in Figure 1 is
a gadget with three node-disjoint paths of length three. The left and right nodes
are source and sink, respectively. We call an input instance shortcut instance, if
it can be constructed by the following two-step process:
1. Let G1, . . . , Gn′ be gadgets. Sequentially join them together by unifying the
sink of each gadget Gi with the source of Gi+1. The source of G1 is denoted
as s, the sink of Gn′ as t.
2. For each pair of integers i < j, for each pricable edge (u, u′) in Gi and each
pricable edge (v, v′) in Gj , we have a ﬁxed cost edge (u′, v). (Note, that we
allow setting the price of edges to ∞, which is equivalent to removing them
from the instance.) Edges created in this step are called shortcuts. The ﬁxed
cost edge of cost j − i− 1 in Figure 2 is an example of shortcut.
Clearly, the instances resulting from our reduction in the previous section are
examples of shortcut instances. It is a natural question to ask whether one can
exploit the special structure of shortcut instances to beat the O(log n) approx-
imation guarantee known for the general path pricing problem. In fact, getting
a better approximation ratio for shortcut graphs would probably even yield in-
sights into potential approaches to improving the general case.
It is, however, not clear at all how to exploit the structure of these seemingly
simple instances. This is so, because in dealing with the shortcut graphs, one
faces the same main barrier currently encountered in the general case: all known
algorithms for the problem rely on the same upper bounding technique, which
yields bounds as large as Θ(log n ·OPT). Unfortunately, it turns out that this is
also the case for shortcut graphs.
The upper bound used by previous algorithms is the quantity f∞(G)− f0(G)
where fx(G), x ∈ R+0 , is deﬁned to be the shortest path length in G when
p(e) = x for all pricable edges e.2 It is known that f∞(G) − f0(G) can be as
large as Ω(log n·OPT) and therefore one cannot hope for a better approximation
guarantee using this upper bound. We show that the same problem occurs in
the family of shortcut instances.
Theorem 3. For infinitely many n, there exists a shortcut graph G of n nodes
with
f∞(G)− f0(G) = Ω((log n/ log logn) · OPT) .
We ﬁrst describe an explicit construction of the shortcut graphs from Theorem 3
and then prove the claim.
Construction. Let α ≥ 2 be any integer and let n = αα. We construct a graph
G of Θ(n) nodes as follows.
2 Intuitively, f∞(G)−f0(G) ≥ OPT follows from the fact that the customer will never
pay more than f∞(G) (and will do so when the pricable edges are very expensive)
and part of this will be paid to the competitor who owns the fixed cost edges; the
latter is at least f0(G) (when the pricable edges are very cheap).
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– Gadgets. There are n gadgets, each of which has (i) a ﬁxed cost edge of
length 1 from source to sink and (ii) a path alternating between two ﬁxed-cost
edges and a pricable edge where ﬁxed cost edges have price 0 (see Fig. 4).
– Shortcuts. For a shortcut from gadget i to gadget j, the price is (j−i)·(k/α)
where k is chosen such that αk−1 ≤ j − i < αk; in this case, we additionally
say that the shortcut is of type k. Observe that 1 ≤ k ≤ α.
We denote by (ai, bi) the pricable edge in gadget i. For the ease of referencing
in the future, we let b0 and bn+1 denote s and t respectively. Moreover, we add
a shortcut of type α (i.e., of cost n) from b0 to bn+1.
Analysis. If all pricable edges have cost ∞ then, since all shortcuts are blocked,
the shortest path will consist of all the gadgets’ ﬁxed cost edges and, thus,
f∞(G) = n. If all pricable edges have cost zero then the shortest path will use
all pricable edges and, hence, f0(G) = 0. Therefore, f∞(G) − f0(G) = n. We
now prove that OPT = O(n/α). This yields the theorem since n = αα implies
that α = Ω(log n/ log logn).
Let p be any pricing and P be the shortest path purchased by the cus-
tomer given this pricing. Let δ1, . . . , δr be the indices of gadgets that con-
tain pricable edges on P (P -edges), so the revenue is collected from edges
(aδ1 , bδ1), . . . , (aδr , bδr). Let δ0 = 0 and δr+1 = n + 1.
The following lemma bounds the price of each pricable edge.
Lemma 1. For any 1 ≤ i ≤ r, p(aδibδi) = O((δi+1 − δi−1)/α).
The fact that OPT ≤ O(n/α) follows as an easy consequence of the lemma, since
r∑
i=1
p(aδi , bδi) ≤
r∑
i=1
O
(
δi+1 − δi−1
α
)
≤ O(n/α).
Proof of Lemma 1. Let P ′ be the subpath of P from bδi−1 to aδi , P ′′ be the
subpath from bδi to aδi+1 . Let k be the type of shortcut (bδi−1 , aδi+1). Notice
that p(aδi , bδi) + c(P ′) + c(P ′′) ≤ (δi+1 − δi−1)k/α, because the customer will
buy shortcut (bδi−1 , aδi+1) instead otherwise. Now proving the following claim
yields the lemma.
Claim. c(P ′) + c(P ′′) ≥ ((δi+1 − δi−1)(k − 2)
)
/α .
Since both P ′ and P ′′ do not contain pricable edges, there are only two possi-
bilities for each of them: path P ′ either takes the shortcut (bδi−1 , aδi) or takes
a sequence of ﬁxed cost edges in gadgets δi−1 + 1, . . . , δi − 1 (similarly for P ′′),
and since the ﬁrst option always costs less, we assume that both P ′ and P ′′ take
the ﬁrst option (i.e., take shortcuts).
Our ﬁrst simple observation is that at least one of P ′ and P ′′ is of type at least
(k − 1). To see this, note that assuming the contrary, we have that (δi − δi−1) <
αk−2 and (δi+1 − δi) < αk−2, so, adding them up, δi+1 − δi−1 < αk−1 (because
α ≥ 2), contradicting the assumption that the shortcut (bδi−1 , aδi+1) is of type k.
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Fig. 4. Proof idea of Lemma 1
There are two cases to analyze now. The ﬁrst case is when both P ′ and P ′′
are shortcuts of type at least k − 1. In this case, we have,
c(P ′) + c(P ′′) ≥ (δi − δi−1)(k − 1)/α + (δi+1 − δi)(k − 1)/α
≥ (δi+1 − δi−1)(k − 1)/α .
In the second case, assume w.l.o.g. that P ′ is of type at most k−2. (This means
that P ′′ is of type at least k−1 by our previous observation.) So, δi−δi−1 < αk−2,
while δi+1 − δi−1 ≥ αk−1. Consequently, δi − δi−1 ≤ 1α (δi+1 − δi−1). Therefore,
we get
δi+1 − δi = (δi+1 − δi−1)− (δi − δi−1)
≥ (1− 1/α)(δi+1 − δi−1) .
Since P ′′ is of type at least k − 1, we have
c(P ′′) ≥ (1 − 1/α)(δi+1 − δi−1)(k − 1)
α
≥ (δi+1 − δi−1)(k − 2)
α
.
The second inequality follows because (k − 1)(1− 1/α) = (k − 1 + 1/α− k/α),
and k ≤ α . 
4 Conclusions
We have proven the ﬁrst explicit approximation threshold for any Stackelberg
pricing problem. Still, the approximation threshold for this kind of problem in
general - and the shortest path version in particular - is far from settled. The
following questions seem to constitute fertile ground for future research:
– Can we prove super-constant hardness of approximation results for any kind
of Stackelberg pricing problem?
– Is it possible to achieve a better than logarithmic approximation guarantee
for the Stackelberg shortest path pricing problem? Is there an interesting re-
stricted set of graphs on which constant approximation factors are possible?
In the context of the ﬁrst of these questions, our discussion in Section 3 points
to the obvious need of coming up with novel upper-bounding techniques even
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for restricted problem instances. Some progress towards answering the sec-
ond of these questions has recently been made in [10], where polynomial-time
algorithms are presented for the spanning-tree pricing problem in bounded-
treewidth graphs.
References
1. Aggarwal, G., Feder, T., Motwani, R., Zhu, A.: Algorithms for multi-product pric-
ing. In: Dı´az, J., Karhuma¨ki, J., Lepisto¨, A., Sannella, D. (eds.) ICALP 2004.
LNCS, vol. 3142, pp. 72–83. Springer, Heidelberg (2004)
2. Arora, S., Lund, C.: Hardness Of Approximations. In: Approximation Algorithms
for NP-hard Problems. PWS Publishing Company (1996)
3. Arora, S., Lund, C., Motwani, R., Sudan, M., Szegedy, M.: Proof Verification and
Hardness of Approximation Problems. Journal of the ACM 45(3), 501–555 (1998)
4. Balcan, N., Blum, A., Mansour, Y.: Item Pricing for Revenue Maximization. In:
Proc. of 9th EC (2008)
5. Briest, P.: Uniform Budgets and the Envy-Free Pricing Problem. In: Aceto, L.,
Damg˚ard, I., Goldberg, L.A., Halldo´rsson, M.M., Ingo´lfsdo´ttir, A., Walukiewicz,
I. (eds.) ICALP 2008, Part I. LNCS, vol. 5125, pp. 808–819. Springer, Heidelberg
(2008)
6. Briest, P., Guala`, L., Hoefer, M., Ventre, C.: On Stackelberg Pricing with Computa-
tionally Bounded Consumers. In: Leonardi, S. (ed.) WINE 2009. LNCS, vol. 5929,
pp. 42–54. Springer, Heidelberg (2009)
7. Briest, P., Hoefer, M., Krysta, P.: Stackelberg Network Pricing Games. In: Proc.
of 25th STACS (2008)
8. Briest, P., Krysta, P.: Buying Cheap is Expensive: Hardness of Non-Parametric
Multi-Product Pricing. In: Proc. of 18th SODA (2007)
9. Cardinal, J., Demaine, E., Fiorini, S., Joret, G., Langerman, S., Newman, I.,
Weimann, O.: The Stackelberg Minimum Spanning Tree Game. In: Dehne, F.,
Sack, J.-R., Zeh, N. (eds.) WADS 2007. LNCS, vol. 4619, pp. 64–76. Springer,
Heidelberg (2007)
10. Cardinal, J., Demaine, E., Fiorini, S., Joret, G., Newman, I., Weimann, O.: The
Stackelberg Minimum Spanning Tree Game on Planar and Bounded-Treewidth
Graphs. In: Leonardi, S. (ed.) WINE 2009. LNCS, vol. 5929, pp. 125–136. Springer,
Heidelberg (2009)
11. Chuzhoy, J., Kannan, S., Khanna, S.: Network Pricing for Multicommodity Flows
(2007) (unpublished manuscript)
12. Demaine, E.D., Feige, U., Hajiaghayi, M.T., Salavatipour, M.R.: Combination Can
Be Hard: Approximability of the Unique Coverage Problem. In: Proc. of 17th
SODA (2006)
13. Guruswami, V., Hartline, J.D., Karlin, A.R., Kempe, D., Kenyon, C., McSherry,
F.: On Profit-Maximizing Envy-Free Pricing. In: Proc. of 16th SODA (2005)
14. Joret, G.: Stackelberg Network Pricing is Hard to Approximate. Networks n/a
(2010), doi: 10.1002/net.20391
15. Raz, R.: A Parallel Repetition Theorem. SIAM Journal on Computing 27 (1998)
16. Roch, S., Savard, G., Marcotte, P.: An Approximation Algorithm for Stackelberg
Network Pricing. Networks 46(1), 57–67 (2005)
17. von Stackelberg, H.: Marktform und Gleichgewicht (Market and Equilibrium).
Verlag von Julius Springer, Vienna (1934)
